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TAXING COLONEL SANDERS: RE-EXAMINING
 
CONSTITUTIONAL NEXUS THROUGH THE LENS
 
OF KFC CORP. V. IOWA
*JAMES F. MURTHA, ESQ. 
ABSTRACT
Over twenty years ago, the Supreme Court of the United States
decided that an entity must have a “physical presence” within a state
before that state’s taxing authority can require the entity to pay state
taxes. Since this physical presence requirement was created, a deep
divide among state courts has shaped a confusing landscape
surrounding two issues with the requirement. First, the states disagree
on what constitutes physical presence within a state. Some state courts
have held that mere economic presence in a state is sufficient for a state
to assert its tax jurisdiction. Second, the states disagree on whether the
physical presence requirement applies to all state taxes or merely a 
narrow classification of state taxes, specifically sales and use taxes.
When it created the physical presence requirement, the Supreme Court
hinted that, while it was articulating a standard, the issue of a state’s tax
jurisdiction was best left for Congress to decide. Unfortunately, 
Congress has refused to legislate on this issue. Several state court
decisions interpreting the physical presence requirement have been 
appealed to the Supreme Court—none of them have been granted 
certiorari.
The Supreme Court’s physical presence requirement is the current
* James F. Murtha is a 2010 graduate of Western New England University School of
Law where he received a Juris Doctor, cum laude, and a 2012 graduate of Georgetown
University Law Center where he received a Master of Laws (LL.M.) in Taxation with a
certificate in State and Local Taxation. He is currently a Staff Attorney in the Division of
Enforcement at the United States Securities & Exchange Commission. The Securities and
Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any private 
publication or statement by any of its employees. The views expressed herein are those of the 
author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of the author’s
colleagues on the staff of the Commission. The author thanks his wife and son, Nora and
Connor, for their love and support.
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56 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:55
standard, and it was never expressly limited by the Court to certain
classes of state taxes.  The author argues that the Supreme Court should
articulate a bright-line rule requiring actual physical presence within a
state before the state has the power to impose any tax on an entity.
Given Congress’s refusal to act, and the landscape of uncertainty
currently faced by many multi-state businesses, it is time the Supreme  
Court clears up the tangled underbrush with a bright-line standard.
INTRODUCTION
In KFC Corp. v. Iowa Department of Revenue, the Supreme Court 
of Iowa joined the entrenched divide that currently exists among state
courts over the power of a state to tax the income of an out-of-state
business that has no physical presence within the taxing state.1 
Specifically, the court upheld a decision that an out-of-state holding
company that licensed trademarks to restaurant franchisees was subject
to Iowa corporate income tax on revenue earned from the use of its
trademarks within Iowa.2  By licensing franchises within Iowa, the court
found that the taxpayer, KFC Corporation, received the benefit of an
orderly society within the state and, as a result, was subject to income
tax that otherwise satisfied the requirements of the Commerce Clause.3 
Similar to its predecessor case from South Carolina, Geoffrey Inc. v.
South Carolina Tax Commission,4 KFC seems to violate the Supreme  
Court’s physical-presence requirement as provided in Quill Corp. v.
North Dakota.5  However, KFC appears to have gone two steps further.
First, KFC has added confusion to an already confusing area of the
law by making the “oxymoronic” suggestion6 that even if Quill requires
a physical presence within the taxing state, KFC’s licensing of its
intangible property to Iowa franchisees gave it the functional equivalent
of physical presence in the state.7  As discussed  infra, this “economic
nexus” standard is of questionable basis and goes beyond the case law of
both the Supreme Court and the state courts.
Second, the Iowa Supreme Court ignored a crucial distinction
between the franchising arrangements in Geoffrey and  KFC. That is, 
1. 792 N.W.2d 308 (Iowa 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 97, 98 (2011).
2. Id. at 322-23.
3. Id. at 328.
4. 437 S.E.2d 15 (S.C. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 550 (1993).
5. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
6. Sheldon H. Laskin, Only a Name? Trademark Royalties, Nexus, and Taxing that
which Enriches, 22 AKRON TAX J. 1, 23 (2007).
7. See KFC, 792 N.W.2d at 328.
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572013] TAXING COLONEL SANDERS
unlike Geoffrey, the franchisor in KFC did not involve the state tax  
planning structure of an intangible holding company created and used by 
intellectual property owners to minimize state tax obligations.8  Instead,
KFC involved a contractual franchising agreement between two  
unrelated and independent parties.9 
Recently, the Supreme Court declined to hear KFC10 and continued 
its pattern of refusing to hear cases that would determine whether the
Quill physical presence requirement extends beyond the realm of state  
sales and use tax.11  The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the
question of whether mere economic presence in a state is sufficient
grounds for a state to assert its income tax jurisdiction.12  Given the  
contentious nature of the state taxation area, and in the wake of high-
profile state decisions such as KFC, Amazon.com, LLC v. New York
State Department of Taxation and Finance,13 and, most recently, Lamtec
Corp. v. Washington Department of Revenue,14 the Supreme Court is  
long overdue to grant certiorari on a case relevant to its Commerce
Clause nexus requirement.
This Article will analyze the Commerce Clause’s physical presence 
requirement for state taxation issues through the lens of KFC. The
purpose of this Article is to (1) argue that courts like KFC and Geoffrey
have inappropriately narrowed the Quill physical presence requirement;
and (2) argue that, given the unsettled landscape, the Supreme Court
needs to clarify its position on what qualifies as a substantial nexus to a
state and affirmatively declare that physical presence in the taxing state
is required before a state can exercise its taxing authority over a person
or entity. Part I of this Article will provide an overview of the
Commerce Clause and will trace the history of the Supreme Court’s
Commerce Clause nexus jurisprudence. Part II details the  KFC ruling
while arguing that it represents an overextension of Quill’s physical
presence requirement by the Iowa Supreme Court. Part II also provides
a detailed analysis of a number of the post-Quill state court decisions in
8. 437 S.E.2d 13, 15-16 (S.C. 1993).
9. 792 N.W.2d at 310.
10. KFC Corp. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 132 S. Ct. 97 (2011) (denying writ of  
certiorari).
11. See, e.g., Lanco v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 908 A.2d 176 (N.J. 2006), cert. denied, 
551 U.S. 1131 (2007); A&F Trademark, Inc. v. Tolson, 605 S.E.2d 187 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004), 
cert. denied, 546 U.S. 821 (2005); Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d 15 (S.C. 1993).
12. John A. Swain, State Income Tax Jurisdiction: A Jurisprudential and Policy
Perspective, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 319, 321 (2003).
13. 913 N.Y.S.2d 129 (App. Div. 2010).
14. 246 P.3d 788 (Wash. 2011).
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58 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:55
an effort to illustrate the great divide that currently exists among the
states. Part III argues for requiring a bright-line physical presence
requirement for all state-imposed taxes using economic factors and
undue burdens placed on interstate commerce as justification.  Finally,  
this Article concludes that, due to the failure of Congress to act in this
area of the law, it is time the Supreme Court steps in to settle the split
among the states and affirmatively declare a bright-line rule extending
Quill’s physical presence requirement to all state-imposed taxes.




“Article I, § 8, cl. 3, of the [United States] Constitution expressly
authorizes Congress to ‘regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and 
among the several states.’”15  This is commonly referred to as the  
Commerce Clause. Although the Commerce Clause does not
affirmatively provide for the protection of interstate commerce, the 
Supreme Court has long recognized that the Commerce Clause “has a  
negative sweep” that unquestionably places limitations on state taxation 
powers.16  This and other limits are, commonly referred to as the  
“dormant” Commerce Clause.
Although the dormant Commerce Clause, as it relates to state
taxation issues, has had numerous makeovers since Justice Johnson first
suggested it in his concurring opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden,17 under  
current Commerce Clause jurisprudence, “with certain restrictions,
interstate commerce may be required to pay its fair share of state
taxes.”18 The Supreme Court created a test in Complete Auto Transit,
Inc. v. Brady19 to express the restrictions that the Commerce Clause  
places on state-imposed taxes. Under that test, a state tax will only pass
dormant Commerce Clause muster if it (1) is assessed against a taxpayer
having a “substantial nexus with the taxing State”; (2) “is fairly 
apportioned”; (3) “does not discriminate against interstate commerce”;
and (4) “is fairly related to the services provided by the State.”20  In  
Quill, the Supreme Court confirmed that the four-part test articulated in 
Complete Auto governs the constitutionality of state taxes with respect to
15. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 309 (1992).
16. Id.; Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 648 (1888) (“[N]o state has the right to
lay a tax on interstate commerce in any form . . . .”).
17. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 236 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring).
18. D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 31 (1988).
19. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
20. Id. at 279.
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592013] TAXING COLONEL SANDERS
the Commerce Clause.21 
The first prong of the Complete Auto test, the nexus requirement,  
has been the subject of many court decisions in the past and continues to 
be the subject of many tax controversies today.22  The Supreme Court’s
first interpretation of the nexus prong came ten years earlier in National
Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue.23 There the Court held that
a state could not impose a use tax obligation on a mail-order vendor
where the vendor’s only contact with the taxing state was by mail or
common carrier.24  Thus, the  Bellas Hess court created a safe harbor,  
under the Commerce Clause, from a state-imposed tax in circumstances
where a taxpayer has no physical presence in the taxing state.25 
Twenty-five years later, in Quill, the Supreme Court reconsidered
its Bellas Hess holding.26 Quill involved an attempt by North Dakota to
require Quill Corporation, an out-of-state seller of office furniture that 
lacked a physical presence in the state, to collect a use tax on its sales to
North Dakota residents.27  Quill Corporation “had solicit[ed] business  
through catalogs and flyers, advertisements in national periodicals, and
telephone calls.”28  But Quill had no offices, no real property, and no  
employees located in North Dakota.29  The Supreme Court held that,  
absent a “physical presence” in North Dakota, Quill Corporation’s sales 
into North Dakota did not provide a “substantial nexus” for purposes of
the use tax collection obligation imposed by North Dakota.30  In so  
holding, the Court noted that:
[T]he bright-line rule of Bellas Hess furthers the ends of the dormant
Commerce Clause. Undue burdens on interstate commerce may be
avoided not only by a case-by-case evaluation of the actual burdens
imposed by particular regulations or taxes, but also, in some
21. Quill, 504 U.S. at 311.
22. See, e.g., Orvis Co. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 86 N.Y.2d 165, 169-70 (N.Y. 1995).
23. 386 U.S. 753 (1967), overruled by Quill, 504 U.S. 298.
24. Id. at 758.
25. Id. (“In order to uphold the power of Illinois to impose use tax burdens on [Bellas 
Hess] in this case, we would have to repudiate totally the sharp distinction which these and
other decisions have drawn between mail order sellers with retail outlets, solicitors, or
property within a State, and those who do no more than communicate with customers in the
State by mail or common carrier as part of a general interstate business. But this basic
distinction, which until now has been generally recognized by the state taxing authorities, is a
valid one, and we decline to obliterate it.”).
26. Quill, 504 U.S. at 315.
27. Id. at 303.
28. Id. at 302.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 313-14.
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60 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:55
situations, by the demarcation of a discrete realm of commercial
activity that is free from interstate taxation.31 
Although Quill involved a sales and use tax, the physical presence
requirement is the current doctrine regarding state tax nexus issues and
there is no United States Supreme Court precedent expressly limiting
that requirement to sales and use taxes.
II. KFC CORPORATION V. IOWA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE
KFC Corporation was “a Delaware corporation with its principal
place of business in . . .  Kentucky.”32  KFC owned and licensed  
restaurant trademarks and the related system designed to maintain a
uniform nationwide restaurant product.33  As part of its business model,
KFC entered into franchise agreements with franchisees in Iowa who
paid royalty payments of four percent of gross monthly revenue to KFC
for the right to use KFC’s trademarks and systems.34  Under the  
agreements, KFC controlled the franchisees’ use of KFC’s trademarks,  
as well as the nature and quality of the goods sold by the franchisees.35 
However, KFC did not own any restaurant property in Iowa and had no
employees in Iowa.36  After years of contracting with Iowa franchisees
and receiving royalty income pursuant to its franchise agreements, KFC
was issued a tax assessment by the Iowa Department of Revenue
(IDOR) for unpaid corporate income taxes.37 
KFC appealed to an Iowa administrative law judge (ALJ) who
issued a detailed ruling in favor of the IDOR holding that the tax
assessment did not violate the Commerce Clause.38  The ALJ determined
that “KFC owned, managed, protected, and licensed” the KFC
trademarks and systems within Iowa.39  The ALJ also concluded that  
“[t]hroughout the period, KFC had the rights to control the use of its
[trade]marks” as well as “the right to control the nature and quality of
31. Id. at 314-15.
32. KFC Corp. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 792 N.W.2d 308, 310 (Iowa 2010).
33. Id. The “system” in a franchise context is often defined in a franchise agreement
and typically refers to a system of distinctive business formats, methods, procedures, designs,
store layout, signage, equipment, menus, recipes and standards of operation. Id.; see, e.g., 
FSC Franchise Co., LLC v. Bel-Mar, Inc., NOS. 8:10-CV-450-T-23TBM, 2010 WL 1627083,
at *1, n.4 (M.D. Fla. 2010).




38. Id. at 311.
39. Id.
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612013] TAXING COLONEL SANDERS
the goods sold under” its trademarks in Iowa.40  Additionally, the ALJ  
found that the franchise agreements required the franchisees to adhere to
KFC’s requirements regarding menus, advertising, marketing, and 
restaurant facilities.41  Finally, the ALJ found that the Iowa franchisees 
could deduct the royalty payments made to KFC from their taxable 
income.42 
Applying the law to its factual findings, the ALJ held that the IDOR
assessment did not violate the Commerce Clause because “physical
presence is not required when a state imposes taxation on income.”43 
Further, the ALJ concluded “that KFC had a sufficient nexus to Iowa to
support” the imposition of a tax.44  According to the ALJ,  “[t]he
imposition of [a] tax on income generated by a franchisor within a state
was not an undue burden on commerce, but rather a payment to [the
State of Iowa] that provided the economic climate for [KFC] to
prosper.”45 
KFC appealed the ALJ ruling several times before the case ended
up before the Iowa Supreme Court.46  After conducting a  de novo
review, the KFC court issued two holdings with respect to Iowa’s ability
to tax KFC without violating the Commerce Clause. First, limiting the 
physical presence requirement of Quill to sales and use tax, the Iowa
Supreme Court held that physical presence is not required for the
imposition of a corporate income tax.47  Therefore, according to the Iowa
Supreme Court, KFC had a sufficient nexus with the state so as not to
violate the Commerce Clause.48  Second, surprisingly, the court held that
KFC’s licensing of its trademarks to its Iowa franchisees was the
“functional equivalent” of physical presence in the state.49  Thus,  
according to the court, KFC would have been subject to the Iowa 








46. Id. at 311-12.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 323-24.
49. Id. at 324.
50. Id.
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62 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:55
A. The “Functional Equivalent” of Physical Presence Holding
As support for its finding that KFC’s licensing of its trademarks to
Iowa franchisees was the functional equivalent of physical presence, the
Iowa Supreme Court stated:
Unlike in Quill, where the only presence in the state, except for “title
to a few floppy diskettes,” resulted from the use of United States  
mail and common carriers, this case involves the use of KFC’s
intangible property within the State of Iowa to produce royalty
income.51 
Thus, according to the court, the mere “presence of transactions
within the state that give rise to KFC’s revenue” was sufficient to satisfy
the Commerce Clause nexus requirement.52 
This new functional equivalency test goes beyond the jurisprudence
of both the Supreme Court and the other state courts that have
considered the issue. Moreover, this novel jurisprudential invention by 
the Iowa Supreme Court is of questionable basis. Every case cited by
the KFC court as support for the proposition that intangible property is
the functional equivalent of physical presence in the state was decided
before Quill.53  More importantly, the cases cited were decided solely on
Due Process, and not Commerce Clause, grounds.54  The Iowa Supreme
Court ignored this critical distinction when it issued its decision in
KFC.55 
51. Id. at 323.
52. Id.
53. Id. The KFC court acknowledged this by stating that “[u]nder the applicable pre-
Quill case law, the use of intangibles within a state to generate revenue for an out-of-state 
entity was generally regarded as a sufficient nexus under the dormant Commerce Clause to
support the imposition of a state income tax.” Id.
54. See Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 464-65 (1959)
(observing that, for due process purposes, income tax could be supported if the “activities
form a sufficient nexus between such a tax and transactions within a state for which the tax is
an exaction”) (internal quotations omitted); Int’l Harvester Co. v. Wis. Dep’t of Taxation, 322
U.S. 435, 441 (1944) (stating that, for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, “[p]ersonal  
presence within the state of the stockholder-taxpayers is not essential to the constitutional levy
of a tax taken out of so much of the corporation’s . . . earnings as is distributed to them”);
State of Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444-45 (1940) (physical presence in 
state is not required by the Due Process Clause); New York ex. rel. Whitney v. Graves, 299
U.S. 366, 372 (1937) (“business situs” of intangible property in taxing state is sufficient nexus
for due process purposes).
55. See generally KFC, 792 N.W.2d at 310-12.
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632013]	 TAXING COLONEL SANDERS
1.	 Quill Established Different Standards for the Due Process 
Clause and the Commerce Clause
In Quill, the United States Supreme Court articulated separate and
distinct nexus standards under the Due Process and Commerce
Clauses.56  The KFC court failed to recognize this critical distinction and
based its functional equivalency test on pre-Quill cases that were 
decided on due process grounds.57 
Under the Due Process Clause, the Quill court held that  in
personam jurisdiction principles, including a minimum contacts  
standard, should apply.58  The  Quill court then concluded that Quill
Corporation had “purposefully directed its activities at North Dakota
residents” and that imposing a use tax collection obligation was “related
to the benefits Quill receive[d] from access to the State,” so as to satisfy
the Due Process Clause.59  Critically, however, the Supreme Court noted
that “a corporation may have the ‘minimum contacts’ with a taxing State
as required by the Due Process Clause, and yet lack the ‘substantial
nexus’ with that State as required by the Commerce Clause.”60 
Despite Quill’s clear distinction between the Due Process and
Commerce Clause nexus, as well as its physical-presence requirement,
the KFC court found that “[u]nder the applicable pre-Quill case law, the
use of intangibles within a state to generate revenue for an out-of-state
entity was generally regarded as a sufficient nexus under the dormant
Commerce Clause to support the imposition of a state income tax.”61 
The KFC court then cited  New York ex. rel. Whitney v. Graves62 as an
example of a Supreme Court case that supports its holding that in-state
intangible property of an out-of-state entity is “the functional equivalent
of physical presence.”63 
Whitney involved a Due Process Clause challenge to the taxation of
profits made from the sale of a seat on the New York Stock Exchange by
a Massachusetts partnership.64  Although the partnership-taxpayer in
56.	 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305 (1992).
57.	 See generally supra notes 53-54.
58. Quill, 504 U.S. at 306-07 (“The Due Process Clause ‘requires some definite link,
some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to
tax . . . .’”).
59.	 Id. at 308.
60.	 Id. at 313.
61.	 KFC Corp. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 792 N.W.2d 308, 323 (Iowa 2010).
62.	 299 U.S. 366 (1937).
63.	 KFC, 792 N.W.2d at 323-24 (quotations omitted).
64. 299 U.S. at 369. The taxpayer argued that the tax “contravene[d] the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Id. at 370.
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64 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:55
Whitney had no physical presence in New York, the Supreme Court
found that the partnership’s seat on the New York Stock Exchange was
sufficiently localized so as “to bring it within the taxing power of” the
state.65  According to the KFC court, “under Whitney,” KFC’s licensing
of its trademarks to Iowa franchisees “provide[s] a ‘business situs’
sufficient to” meet Quill’s physical-presence requirement.66 
By relying on Whitney as its foundational basis for the functional
equivalency test, the KFC court ignored Quill’s physical-presence
requirement and created its own constitutional standard.67  Inasmuch as
Quill established that there are two different standards for Due Process
and Commerce Clause nexus, the Whitney case lends little support to the 
KFC court’s holding.68  Critically,  Whitney was decided exclusively on
Due Process grounds; there was no Commerce Clause challenge in that
case.69  When Quill severed the Commerce Clause nexus standard from
the Due Process Clause analysis, the pre-Quill cases that were decided  
on Due Process grounds became irrelevant for current Commerce Clause
nexus purposes. Accordingly, the KFC court’s heavy reliance on nexus
theories that predate the Supreme Court’s split of the Due Process and  
Commerce Clause analysis is of questionable validity.
2. Quill’s “Bright-Line” Nexus Standard
The KFC decision also ignored the Supreme Court’s recognition of
“the continuing value of a bright-line rule in this area” of the law.70 
While at least one commentator has argued that an economic presence
standard is in line with the tax policy values of “equity, efficiency, and
administrability,”71 there are advantages to the bright-line physical-
presence standard.
As the Quill court recognized, “our law in this area is something of
a ‘quagmire’ and the ‘application of constitutional principles to specific 
state statutes leaves much room for controversy and confusion and little
in the way of precise guides to the States in exercise of their
65. Id. at 374.
66. KFC, 792 N.W.2d  at 323.
67. Id. at 323-24.
68. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305 (1992) (establishing two separate  
standards).
69. See Whitney, 299 U.S. 366.
70. Quill, 504 U.S. at 317. Compare KFC, 792 N.W.2d at 314 (opining incorrectly that
the Supreme Court “has emphasized a flexible approach based on economic reality”), with
Quill, 504 U.S. at 317-18 (endorsing a “bright-line, physical-presence requirement” for
Commerce Clause nexus).
71. Swain, supra note 12, at 374.
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652013]	 TAXING COLONEL SANDERS
indispensable power of taxation.’”72  The Quill court quoted an income 
tax case, Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota,73 and
did not state that the “quagmire” it intended to remedy was limited to 
sales and use tax.  A state’s reach must end somewhere and the bright-
line test—while not perfect—is clear, administrable, and protects against 
a state’s propensity to outsource its tax burden and overburden interstate
commerce. Given the current economic climate, with many states
starved for revenue, the bright-line physical-presence requirement
ensures that states cannot impose a tax on taxpayers who receive no
benefits from the state.
B.	 Current Split Among State Courts as to Whether a State Can Tax an
Out-of-State Entity That Lacks a Physical Presence in the State
Currently, there is a deep divide among state courts over the
question of whether Quill’s physical-presence requirement applies
outside the sales and use tax context. In KFC, the Iowa Supreme Court 
recognized this split but chose to hold that Quill’s physical-presence
requirement was not required for a state to impose a corporate income
tax.74  Many of the cases and law review articles cited by the KFC court
as supporting its holding find their foundation in the South Carolina
Supreme Court decision of Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax
Commission.75 
1.	 Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission
Geoffrey involved Geoffrey, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of the
mega toy retailer Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc.76  Geoffrey was a Delaware
corporation with its principal offices in Delaware.77  The company  
owned no tangible property in South Carolina and did not have any 
employees in that state.78  In 1984, Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc. granted Geoffrey 
ownership of several trademarks and trade names, including “Toys ‘R’
Us.”79  Later that year, Geoffrey and Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc. executed a  
License Agreement (the “Agreement”).80 Under the Agreement Toys ‘R’
72. Quill, 504 U.S. at 315-16 (quoting an income tax case, Nw. States Portland Cement 
Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457-58 (1959)).
73.	 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
74.	 KFC, 792 N.W.2d at 328.
75.	 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 550 (1993).
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66 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:55
Us, Inc. was entitled to use the trade name “Toys ‘R’ Us” as well as  
other trademarks and trade names in South Carolina and several other
states.81  Additionally, the Agreement granted Toys ‘R’ Us the right to
use Geoffrey’s “merchandising skills, techniques and ‘know how’ in 
connection with marketing, promotion, advertising, and sale of products
covered by the Agreement.”82  In return, Geoffrey received royalty  
payments that amounted to one percent of Toys ‘R’ Us, or any of its
subsidiaries’, net sales of products and services.83  It was this royalty  
income that the South Carolina Tax Commission sought to tax.84 
Geoffrey challenged the assessment on the grounds that it lacked a
substantial nexus with South Carolina sufficient for the state to tax the
associated royalty income.85 
In summary fashion, the Geoffrey court concluded that the physical-
presence requirement of Bellas Hess and Quill was not required for  
purposes of the royalty tax at issue.86  According to the South Carolina 
Supreme Court, “any corporation that regularly exploits the markets of a
state should be subject to its jurisdiction to impose an income tax even 
though not physically present.”87  Although the  Geoffrey court did not  
expressly say it, implicit in its analysis is the fact that Geoffrey was
created as a Toys ‘R’ Us subsidiary intangible holding company (IHC)
for the sole purpose of minimizing state tax obligations. That was not
the case in KFC. KFC involved wholly independent franchisors and  
franchisees.88 
2. State Courts That Followed Geoffrey
Like Geoffrey, a number of state courts have refused to extend
Quill’s physical-presence requirement in situations where a state






86. Id. at 18-19.
87. Id. at 18 (citations omitted).
88. See KFC Corp. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 792 N.W.2d 308, 310 (Iowa 2010).
89. See, e.g., A&F Trademark, Inc. v. Tolson, 605 S.E.2d 187, 195 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2004) (“[W]e hold that under facts such as these where a wholly-owned subsidiary licenses
trademarks to a related retail company operating stores located within [the State], there exists
a substantial nexus with the State sufficient to satisfy the Commerce Clause.”), cert. denied, 
546 U.S. 281 (2005); Kmart Properties, Inc. v. Taxation & Rev. Dep’t of New Mexico, 131
P.3d 27, 36 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that “the use of KPI’s marks within New Mexico’s
economic market, for the purpose of generating substantial income for KPI, establishes a 
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672013] TAXING COLONEL SANDERS
majority of those cases involved situations where a wholly owned
subsidiary licenses its trademarks to a related retail company operating
stores located within the state.90 
In A&F Trademark, Inc. v. Tolson,91 the North Carolina Court of  
Appeals upheld the assessment of corporate franchise and income taxes
against wholly-owned, non-domiciliary subsidiary corporations of
Limited, Inc.92 The case involved an arrangement by a group of
retailers—including Abercrombie & Fitch, Lane Bryant, Inc., and
Victoria’s Secret, Inc.—whereby the retailers assigned their trademarks
and associated goodwill to an IHC in a tax-free transaction for little or
no consideration.93  Subsequent to the assignment of the trademarks, the
retailers and their related IHC entered into licensing agreements that
required the IHC to license the trademarks back to the retailer.94  The  
related retail companies had over 130 locations in North Carolina.95  The
taxpayers did not file corporate franchise and income tax returns in
North Carolina for the years that were at issue.96  The North Carolina  
Secretary of Revenue proposed assessments to the taxpayers for the
unpaid franchise and income taxes.97  After a number of unsuccessful  
appeals by the taxpayers, the case ultimately landed in front of the North 
Carolina Court of Appeals.98 
“The taxpayers contend[ed] that the presence of their intangible
property in North Carolina [as a result of license fees paid for use of
trademarks] is irrelevant in light of the lack of physical presence of
offices, facilities, employees, and real or tangible property . . . .”99 
Accordingly, the taxpayer asserted that the Bella Hess decision required
a finding that the tax sought to be imposed by North Carolina violated
the Commerce Clause.100  Specifically, the taxpayers argued that they  
sufficient nexus between that income and the legitimate interests of the state and justifies the
imposition of a state income tax”), rev’d on other issues, 131 P.3d 22 (N.M. 2005).
90. See, e.g., Geoffrey, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 132 P.3d 632, 634 (Okla. Civ.
App. 2006); Lanco, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 879 A.2d 1234, 1236 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2005), aff’d, 908 A.2d 176 (N.J. 2006), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1131 (2007); A&F 
Trademark, Inc., 605 S.E.2d at 195; Kmart Properties, Inc., 131 P.3d at 30-31.
91. 605 S.E.2d 187 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
92. Id. at 195.
93. Id. at 189.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 190.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 193.
100. Id.
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68 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:55
lacked a substantial nexus with North Carolina because they had no
physical presence within the state.101 
The North Carolina Court of Appeals stated three reasons for
declining to hold that Quill required a physical presence in the taxing  
state for income tax purposes.102  First, the court stated that the tone in 
Quill “hardly indicates a sweeping endorsement of the bright-line test it 
preserved, and the Supreme Court’s hesitancy to embrace the test
certainly counsels against expansion of it.”103  The court observed that  
“recent Commerce Clause decisions [signaled] a retreat from the
formalistic constrictions of a stringent physical presence test in favor of
a more flexible [] approach.”104  Second, the court felt that the retention
of the Bella Hess decision in Quill was based “on the principle of stare
decisis and the ‘substantial reliance’ on the physical-presence test, which 
had become a part of the basic framework of a sizable industry.”105 
Finally, A&F Trademark found “important distinctions between sales  
and use taxes [as compared to] income and franchise taxes that ‘makes
[sic] the physical presence test of the vendor use tax collection cases
inappropriate as a nexus test’” for taxation other than sales and use 
taxes.106  Thus, the North Carolina court in  A&F Trademark followed  
the Geoffrey decision and concluded:
[W]e reject the contention that physical presence is the sine qua non
of a state’s jurisdiction to tax under the Commerce Clause for  
purposes of income and franchise taxes. Rather, we hold that under
facts such as these where a wholly-owned subsidiary licenses
trademarks to a related retail company operating stores located
within North Carolina, there exists a substantial nexus with the State
sufficient to satisfy the Commerce Clause.107 
In Lanco, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation,108 the New Jersey
Appellate Division relied heavily on A&F Trademark in holding that  
New Jersey could constitutionally subject a foreign corporation with no 
offices, employees, or real tangible property in New Jersey to the state’s
corporate income tax.109  Lanco, Inc. (Lanco) was a Delaware  
101. Id.
102. Id. at 194-95.
103. Id. at 194.
104. Id. (quoting Quill, 504 U.S. at 314).
105. Id. (quoting Quill, 504 U.S. at 317).
106. Id. (quoting Jerome R. Hellerstein, Geoffrey and the Physical Presence Nexus
Requirement of Quill, 8 ST. TAX NOTES, 671, 676 (1995)).
107. Id. at 195.
108. 879 A.2d 1234 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005).
109. Id. at 1239-42.
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692013] TAXING COLONEL SANDERS
corporation that owned intangible property such as trademarks, trade  
names, and service marks.110  It was undisputed that Lanco had no  
offices, employees, or real property in New Jersey.111  In exchange for  
royalty payments, Lanco licensed to Lane Bryant, Inc., one of its
affiliate corporations, the use of intangible property in the conduct of
Lane Bryant’s retail operations, including its locations in New Jersey.  
New Jersey’s Division of Taxation determined that the activity under the
license agreement gave New Jersey the requisite nexus to tax Lanco.112 
After a detailed review of Quill, Geoffrey, and A&F Trademark, the
Lanco court concluded that “[t]he recent and, in our view, the more  
persuasive authority leads us to join the jurisdictions which have
followed Geoffrey and to uphold the tax.”113  Using A&F Trademark as
its guide through the law, the Lanco court declared “that the physical  
presence requirement applicable to use and sales taxes is not applicable
.”114to income tax . . .   On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court  
affirmed “substantially for the reasons expressed in [the appellate
court’s] thorough and thoughtful opinion.”115  While recognizing that “a
split of authority has developed” since Quill, the court held that “the
better interpretation of Quill is the one adopted by those states that limit
the Supreme Court’s holding to sales and use taxes.”116  In their view,  
the United States Supreme Court did not intend “to create a universal
physical-presence requirement for state taxation under the Commerce
Clause.”117 
3. State Courts That Refused to Follow Geoffrey
As discussed supra, a number of state courts have chosen to limit 
Quill’s physical-presence requirement to state sales and use taxes.
However, courts in states such as Michigan, Tennessee, and Texas have 
not so limited Quill’s application, but have alternatively retained the 
Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause physical-presence requirement.
In Rylander v. Bandag Licensing Corp., the court held that Texas
cannot impose a franchise tax on an out-of-state business with no
physical presence in the state.118  Bandag Licensing Corporation (BLC)
110. Id. at 1236.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1238.
114. Id. at 1242.
115. Lanco, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 908 A.2d 176, 176 (N.J. 2006).
116. Id. at 177.
117. Id.
118. 18 S.W.3d 296, 301 (Tex. App. 2000).
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70 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:55
was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Bandag Corporation (Bandag).119 
Bandag was a corporation organized and existing under the laws of
Iowa.120  During the tax years at issue in the case, BLC maintained a  
certificate of authority to transact business in Texas, but “did not own,
possess, use, or maintain any real property” in Texas.121  Additionally,  
“BLC did not have salespeople, employees, independent contractors, or
any other type of representatives in Texas.”122 
The Texas comptroller argued that BLC had a “substantial nexus”
with the state simply because the corporation was licensed to conduct
business in Texas and had receipts from the use of intangible property in 
the state.123  In its decision, the  Rylander court first noted that “[t]his  
question seems to have little to do with whether the tax in question is a
sales tax, an income tax, a franchise tax, a gross receipts tax, or some
other form of tax. The issue is whether the state may impose any kind of
tax in light of the Commerce Clause.”124  Next, the court rejected the
comptroller’s argument, holding that the “physical presence” 
requirement in Quill is not limited to sales and use taxes, stating:
While the decisions in Quill Corp. and  Bellas Hess involved sales  
and use taxes, we see no principled distinction when the basic issue
remains whether the state can tax the corporation at all under the
Commerce Clause. As construed in Quill Corp. and  Bellas Hess, 
when the corporation conducts its activity solely through interstate
commerce and lacks any physical presence in the state, no sufficient
nexus exists to permit the state to assess tax.125 
Thus, the court held the imposition of the franchise tax on the
taxpayer violated the Commerce Clause.126 
Similarly, in J.C. Penney National Bank v. Johnson,127 the  
Tennessee Court of Appeals rejected an attempt by the Tennessee
Commissioner of Revenue to impose the state’s income-based franchise
and excise taxes on income from J.C. Penney’s credit card business
operated by J.C. Penney’s out-of-state credit card bank.128  Making sure
not to decide whether physical presence was required, the court noted





124. Id. at 299 n.2.
125. Id. at 300.
126. Id.
127. 19 S.W.3d 831 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 927 (2000).
128. Id. at 842.
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712013] TAXING COLONEL SANDERS
that the Commissioner of Revenue cited no authority in which the
United States Supreme Court had “upheld a state tax where the out-of-
state taxpayer had absolutely no physical presence.”129  Specifically, the
court said:
While it is true that the Bellas Hess and Quill decisions focused on
use taxes, we find no basis for concluding that the analysis should be
different in the present case. In fact, the Commissioner is unable to
provide any authority as to why the analysis should be different for
franchise and excise taxes. It is certainly true that the Quill Court  
expressed some reservations about the vitality of the Bellas Hess
decision . . . . However, we are not in a position to speculate as to
how the Supreme Court might decide future cases. We are only able
to rely on past decisions. Any constitutional distinctions between
the franchise and excise taxes presented here and the use taxes 
contemplated in Bellas Hess and Quill are not within the purview of
this court to discern. As such, we feel that the outcome of this case
is governed by Bellas Hess and Quill, as those decisions interpret the
first prong of the Complete Auto test.130 
Accordingly, the J.C. Penney court held that since the bank was not
physically present in Tennessee, “the activities which allowed [J.C.
Penney] to conduct its credit card operation did not occur in” that state
and the tax violated the Commerce Clause.131  Interestingly, under  
Tennessee law, by allowing the Tennessee Court of Appeal’s opinion to
be published, the Tennessee Supreme Court gave the J.C. Penney
decision statewide precedential effect.132 
The Michigan Court of Appeals also held that the Quill “physical  
presence” requirement was applicable to all taxes, not just sales and use 
taxes, in Guardian Industries Corp. v. Department of Treasury.133  In  
that case, Guardian was an entity having its principal place of business
in Michigan.134  Guardian was in the business of soliciting “sales in  
various target states with activities which include calling on customers
129. Id.
130. Id. at 839.
131. Id. at 841-42.
132. See, e.g., Meadows v. State of Tennessee, 849 S.W.2d 748, 752 (Tenn. 1993)
(“[T]he published opinions of the intermediate appellate courts [of Tennessee] are opinions
which have precedential value and may be relied upon by the bench and bar of this state as
representing the present state of the law with the same confidence and reliability as the
published opinions of this Court, so long as [they] are not overruled or modified by
subsequent decisions.”).
133. 499 N.W.2d 349, 374-75 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993), appeal denied sub nom. Cargill,
Inc. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 512 N.W.2d 846 (Mich. 1994).
134. Id. at 352.
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72 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:55
and taking orders.”135  Guardian challenged a tax imposed by the  
Michigan Department of Treasury that sought to tax sales Guardian had
made in target states. Guardian claimed it was subject to taxation for  
those same sales by the target states.136 
The Guardian court noted that the “principal question [was]  
whether a taxpayer’s solicitation of business in foreign states, alone,
creates a sufficient nexus with the states that they may tax the sales.”137 
The Michigan Court of Appeals held that Quill made it “abundantly  
clear that [the taxpayer] must show a physical presence within a target
state to establish a substantial nexus to it.”138  Subsequent to the  
Guardian decision, the Michigan Department of  Revenue announced
that it would adhere to Quill’s physical-presence requirement.139 
In summary, post-Quill state tax nexus decisions reflect a deep  
divide over the applicability of Quill’s physical-presence requirement to 
taxes other than sales and use taxes. Clearly, “there is a ‘need for
clearing up the tangled underbrush of past cases’ with reference to the
taxing power of the States . . . .”140 
III. ARGUMENT FOR A BRIGHT-LINE STANDARD
Contrary to what other commentators have said,141 Quill clearly  
establishes that Commerce Clause “substantial nexus” requires a 
corporation to be physically present for all taxing purposes.142 
Moreover, for a “court to hold that physical presence is not mandatory
upsets settled expectations, reliance interests, and the rule of stare
decisis.”143  By continuing to refuse to weigh in on nexus cases, the
Supreme Court is turning a blind eye to a number of consequences that 
are associated with permitting state high courts to side with their taxing
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 353.
138. Id. at 356.
139. See J.W. Hobbs Corp. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 706 N.W.2d 460, 463 (Mich. Ct. App.
2005), appeal denied, 731 N.W.2d 745 (Mich. 2007).
140. Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. State of Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457 (1959)
(quoting State of Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 445 (1940)).
141. See, e.g., Michael T. Fatale, Geoffrey Sidesteps Quill: Constitutional Nexus,
Intangible Property and the State Taxation of Income, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 407, 425 (1994);
Laskin, supra note 6, at 12.
142. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992).
143. Richard H. Kirk, Supreme Court Refuses to Re-Examine Whether Physical 
Presence Is a Prerequisite to State Income Tax Jurisdiction: Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina
Tax Commission, 48 TAX LAW. 271, 277 (1994).
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732013] TAXING COLONEL SANDERS
authorities.
First, while at least one commentator has argued that “the unique  
burdens of use tax collection justify” a physical-presence standard only 
for sales and use tax,144 income taxes impose a far greater burden on  
companies engaging in interstate commerce than do sales and use taxes.
Sales and use taxes are imposed on the buyer, not the seller; thus the
primary cost associated with a sales and use tax is the administrative
costs of calculating, collecting, and remitting the taxes on behalf of the 
buyers. By contrast, income taxes come right out of the pocket of the
business engaging in interstate commerce. Moreover, income taxes
require companies to make a myriad of determinations that are arguably 
more complex than those associated with a sales or use tax, including:
(1) filing methodology, i.e., whether the franchisor must file a
combined return with affiliates or a separate return; (2) tax base, i.e.,
the calculation of state taxable income, including the use of
corporate attributes such as net operating loss deductions and tax
credits; (3) division of income based on each state’s particular
formulary apportionment; (4) procedural rules such as estimated tax
and final return due dates; and (5) tax rates to apply to the different
amounts of taxable income allocated to each jurisdiction.145 
Unlike the approximately 1,500 other franchisors who represent a
significant percentage of the franchising community’s U.S. economy, 
KFC may have sufficient resources to carry the additional administrative
burdens and expenses associated with filing 50 or more state income tax
returns.146  For these smaller franchisors, the combination of paying  
more taxes on the same royalty dollar, a drastic increase in the number
of income-based tax filings, and the associated costs of those filings,
may be too heavy a burden to carry.147  Absent a physical-presence
requirement for all state-imposed taxes, out-of-state businesses will be
forced to incur both the administrative burden, as well as the burden of 
actually paying the tax. Surely it cannot be reasonably argued that this is
less of a burden then those associated with sales and use taxes.
Additionally, franchising in the United States has grown from
producing $624.6 billion of economic output in 2001 to $802 billion in 
144. Laskin, supra note 6.
145. Brief of Amicus Curiae International Franchise Association in Support of Granting
the Petition at 14, KFC Corp. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 792 N.W.2d 308 (Iowa 2010) (No.
10-1340) cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 97, 98 (2011).
146. Id. at 6.
147. See id.
MURTHA FINAL 51313.DOC 5/15/13 2:42 PM       
      
   
       
          
        
       
    
  
        
         
     
  
       
         
        
        
        
            
          
  
  
          
           
        
            
   
       
             
     
        
 
       
    
 
        
          
        
         
            
           




74 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:55
2007.148  As the International Franchise Association has said, “[w]hile
no single factor can account for franchising’s growth, franchisors’ ability 
to limit and know in advance their state tax filing obligations
undoubtedly played a significant role. Specifically, it permitted
franchisors to lower franchise costs while maintaining sufficient returns
on investment, thereby spurring economic activity and job growth.”149 
The Quill court had similar concerns when it determined that “it is not  
unlikely that the mail-order industry’s dramatic growth over the last
quarter century is due in part to the bright-line exemption from state
taxation created in Bellas Hess.”150  Thus, the economic growth of the  
country was, and still is, an important Commerce Clause factor to  
consider and bolsters the argument that physical presence in a state 
should be required before a tax can be imposed.
Second, contrary to what other commentators have said,151 
“substantial nexus” under the Commerce Clause demands a single nexus 
standard for purposes of state taxation. Giving “substantial nexus”
differing meanings, based on the tax in question and the state imposing
the tax, is without logic. As the Institute for Professionals in Taxation
has explained:
The [KFC court’s] “economic nexus” contention fails to square with
the Court’s directive that the Commerce Clause be applied upon the
basis of the “practical effect” of the tax. Any effort to distinguish a
use tax as an “indirect” tax from an income tax as a “direct” levy 
would be a step backwards to the type of semantic formalism the
Court has definitively repudiated.152 
Moreover, bifurcating “substantial nexus” into two remarkably
different standards, one for income taxes and a second for sales and use
taxes, “would invite the formulation of additional jurisdictional 
standards for other taxes”–a result surely not implicit in the Quill
148. Economic Impact of Franchised Businesses: Vol. 2—Executive Summary and
Highlights, INT’L FRANCHISE ASSOC., at 7, available at
http://www.franchise.org/uploadedFiles/Franchisors/Other_Content/economic_impact_docum 
ents/EconImpact_Vol2_HiLights.pdf.
149. Brief of Amicus Curiae International Franchise Association, supra note 145, at 10.
150. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 316 (1992).
151. See, e.g., Laskin, supra note 6, at 23 (“[T]he Commerce Clause nexus test itself
should not be identical for all taxes, because a ‘one size fits all’ physical presence test does 
not reflect material differences in the nature of each tax and the characteristics of the asset or
income being taxed. Such differences render a physical presence Commerce Clause nexus
test entirely unworkable as applied to the taxation of intangibles or the income derived
therefrom.”).
152. Id. at 17 (quoting Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 288-89
(1977)).
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752013] TAXING COLONEL SANDERS
decision.153 Quill expressly endorsed the bright-line physical-presence
rule because it “firmly establishes the boundaries of legitimate state
authority” and “reduces litigation” concerning state taxation.154  Further,
as noted by the Quill court, the bright-line rule “encourages settled
expectations and, in doing so, fosters investment by business[es] and
individuals.”155 
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has long held that the Commerce Clause
requires a “substantial nexus” between a taxing state and an out-of-state
business “before any tax may be levied” against the business.156  It has 
been almost twenty years since the Supreme Court decided Quill.157  An
obvious concern that the Quill court had was that this area of the law
was best reserved to the legislative, as opposed to the judicial branch.
Unfortunately, the legislature has not heeded the Quill court’s advice.  
As a result, it is time the Supreme Court steps in and helps to clarify the
issue. Without Supreme Court intervention, tax-starved states will be
able to tax income derived from any contractual or economic 
relationship in which an out-of-state party receives income from an in-
state party.
Moreover, a bright-line rule requiring physical presence cuts down
on litigation costs, allows companies to reasonably forecast and plan for
their state tax liabilities, and helps foster economic growth by reducing
the tax burdens on businesses transacting across state lines. Given that 
income taxes impose, at a minimum, the same burden on companies  
engaged in interstate commerce that sales and use taxes do, the bright-
line rule benefits both types of taxes equally. Varying state definitions
of what constitutes a taxable presence, and palpable uncertainty over
their constitutional validity, are at odds with “the national interest in
keeping interstate commerce free from interferences which seriously 
impede it.”158 
153. Id. at 17-18.
154. Quill, 504 U.S. at 314-15.
155. id. at 316.
156. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 626 (1981).
157. Quill, 504 U.S. 298.
158. S. Pac. Co. v. State of Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 776 (1945).
